A Tunable, Software-based DRAM Error Detection and Correction Library for HPC

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Motivation

- Silent Data Corruption (SDC) → undetected soft errors that result in corruption in storage (Processor, Cache, Disks, RAM, etc)
- SDC faults may manifest themselves as bit-flips in memory
 - Some bit-flips are not correctable or even detected even with hardware ECC protection
 - Exacerbating this situation, when SDC goes undetected,
 applications continue to run while reporting invalid results
 - This is a severe problem for today's large-scale simulations
- Server class hardware supports ECC; one common form provides single error correct, double error detect (SECDEC)
- Non-server class hardware provides no protection
- Today there is no generic way to protect applications without ECC
- Even with ECC, hardware SECDEC protection fails you when 3 or more bit flips occur
- SDC events are expected to grow dramatically as chip density, heat generation, and core counts increase in larger HPC systems

LIBSDC: A software-based solution

- Idea: Provide SDC protection in software by tracking accesses to memory regions and ensuring their integrity before an application uses that region's data
- For each region of memory choose one or both:
 - Hashes: Detect memory corruption via hash mismatches
 - ECC/Hamming Codes: Correct some SDCs, even if hardware ECC failed to detect them
- Application-independent and transparent
 No code changes required for applications
- Using the MMU provides a granularity of a single page for a region


| Method | SHA1 Hashing (4KB pages) | 72/64 Hamming Codes (ECC) |
|---------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Storage Overhead | 0.49% | 12.5% |

Tuning


- Max-unlocked: Adjust the maximum number of pages to be allowed "unlocked" at a time. Ideally set at the number of pages in an application's working-set during runtime
- Hash or ECC: Choose if you desire SDC detection and/or correction
- Memory to protect: Choose or combine:
 - Application's heap, bss, data, and/or code
 - Other linked libraries (optionally include or exclude)

Implementation


- Page tracking is accomplished with mprotect (removing read/write)
 - Each new page access triggers an access violation which allows
 LIBSDC to monitor application activity (SEGV handler)
 - Swap out unlocked pages upon reach max-unlocked
- Permission changes break many libraries
 - Syscalls will fail if passed protected pointers
 - *ptrace* is used to intercept all syscalls and unprotect pointers within syscall parameters
 - o MPI implementations will fail with protected pointers, too
 - LIBSDC's MPI profiling layer wrappers unprotect passed buffers
 - Separate memory allocators prevent unprotected libraries from sharing virtual addresses in the same page as protected data



Memory Verification




On page lock:
Calculate new hash of entire page
Storage hash in separate location
Mark page as locked (mprotect)



HPCCG Results

- HPCCG A Sandia Natl. Labs kernel conjugate gradient solver from the Mantevo Miniapps
- 256 processes on a 768x8x8 matrix
- AMD Opteron 6128 (Magny Core) 16 cores per node
- o 32GB RAM per node
- 40Gbit/s Infiniband



- Ideal max-unlocked around 4096-5120 to match working-set size
- On average, about 15% of overhead spent on page hashing
- 53% overhead vs baseline when tuned with optimal max-unlocked

Future Work

- Recent related work has shown (Ferreira, SC11) page hashing on
 GPUs can greatly reduce the overhead spent hashing on the CPU
- Replace LIBSDC's FIFO policy of unlocked pages with a smarter frequency-based algorithm
- Investigate using kernel page tables/invalid bit to reduce the overhead incurred from frequent use of mprotect (TLB flushes may be responsible for much overhead)